Abstract:
The axiom translation invariance consists in asserting the invariance of the ranking of two utility streams if one applies the same translation to both. This axiom is significant in the characterization of utilitarian criteria in finite dimension. This characterization is achieved thanks to the "weak weighted utilitarianism theorem".The objective here is to propose a generalization of this theorem in a space of infinite and unbounded utility streams. A consequence of the suggested generalization is that, in the context of intergenerational choice, every maximal point with respect to a paretian utilitarian order granting comparable considerations to the present and the future, is also a maximal point with respect to some future-oriented criterion.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The axiom translation invariance (following the terminology of Weibull 1985) consists in asserting the invariance of the ranking of two utility streams if one applies the same translation to both (formal definition in section 2). In the literature, it is also referred to as the translation scale invariance axiom . This theorem affirms that any order satisfying the axiom weak translation invariance (which is a weakened version of translation invariance)a n d also satisfying weak Pareto, is a subrelation to a weighted utilitarianism. This theorem applies in finite dimension, i.e. for a finite number of individuals.
The objective here is to propose a generalization of the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem to a space of infinite and unbounded utility streams. That will apply for example to intergenerational choice (i.e. intertemporal choice with infinite horizon) and unbounded utility streams. Weibull (1985) also proposed a theorem (theorem A) exploring the consequences of the axiom translation invariance for an order defin e do nag e n e r a l normed real vector space. However, the assumptions of Weibull theorem entail representability, that is, the existence of a real-valued order-preserving function. In the context of intergenerational choice, representability is too restrictive as it entails the impossibility to have simultaneously anonymity and weak Pareto (Basu-Mitra 2007b) , which are usually considered as basic principles. Moreover, the theorem proposed here (theorem 5) requires weak translation invariance whereas Weibull theorem requires full translation invariance. The reason of these limitations is that Weibull theorem applies to general spaces, what does not make it possible to exploit properties specifict oi n finite utility streams, namely weak Pareto.
The generalization proposed here shows that, compared with the situation in finite dimension, it is added a term which I proposed to call: linear limits (definition 4). This result makes it possible, in particular, to highlight the relation between equitable utilitarianism for infinite and unbounded streams and linear limits. For example, a consequence is that every maximal point with respect to equitable utilitarianism is also a maximal point with respect to some positive linear limit. In the context of intergenerational choice, this means that equitable utilitarianism must comply entirely with long-term optimality. This result holds if we only impose that the order grants comparable considerations to the present and the future.
The exploitation of the suggested generalization is based on a decomposition of the dual of a space of infinite and unbounded real sequences to which the streams are supposed to belong: l r ∞ (section 3). The decomposition theorem used here (theorem 3) is a generalization to the unbounded case, of the decomposition theorem used in Lauwers (1998) : the Yosida-Hewitt theorem. Chilchinisky (1996) also used the Yosida-Hewitt theorem to study long-termoriented intertemporal criteria. Le Van-Saglam (2004) applied a similar decomposition for the determination of the Lagrange multipliers associated with thecalculusofinfinite horizon optimal growth. We will return to Chilchinisky (1996) and Lauwers (1998) in section 4. Section 2 gives the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem (theorem 1), as well as some comments on the axioms used in this theorem. Section 3 specifies the working space, the norm and gives the decomposition theorem (theorem 3) with a corollary calculating a particular partial derivative of a real valued function interpreted as the sensitivity of the function to long-term changes. Section 4 generalizes theorem 1 (theorem 5). In the context of intergenerational choice, section 5 uses theorem 5 to establish the consequence pointed out above: the necessity to comply with long-term optimality. For the issues tackled in section 5, whether the infinite utility streams are bounded or not does not change the analysis. Therefore, section 5 will consider the more usual case where the infinite utility streams are bounded.
The weak weighted utilitarianism theorem
Denote R t h er e a ll i n ea n dN * the set of positive integers.
For an order R (i.e. a transitive and complete binary relation on a set of alternatives) and two alternatives x and y," x is preferred or indifferent to y" is denoted x % y," x is preferred to y"i sd e n o t e dx Â y and "x is indifferent to y" is denoted x ∼ y. In this section, the set of alternatives is R n ,w h e r en is a positive integer representing the number of individuals.
Following the notation of d'Aspremont-Gevers (2002), the axioms used in this section are:
minimal individual symmetry: ∀i, j in {1, ..., n} , there exist x, y in R n such that x i >y i , x j <y j , x k = y k for all k in {1, ..., n} / {i, j} and x ∼ y.
anonymity: For all permutation π on {1,...,n} and all x in R n ,x∼ πx,
The axiom translation invariance corresponds to inv(a i + x i ).
The axiom weak Pareto expresses a requirement of a minimal sensitivity of the order with respect to the components. The axiom inv(a i + x i ) was presented in section 1. The weakened form weak inv(a i +x i ) does not make it possible to have interpersonal unit comparability because a translation may transform a strict preference between two alternatives in indifference. The axiom minimal individual symmetry is an equity axiom that can accommodate to the incomparability of utilities. "It sets a limit on the influence any individual can exert on the social ranking when he (she) has a single opponent" (d'AspremontGevers 2002, page 54). Finally the axiom anonymity,w e l lk n o w na n du s e di n the literature, expresses the interchangeability of the individuals to the eyes of the social order. It supposes the level-comparability of utilities.
Here is the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem. 
Moreover, if we add minimal individual symmetry (resp. anonymity), we must have every component of λ strictly positive (resp. strictly positive and equal).
Properties of the working spaces

Spaces of bounded growth-rate sequences
Let r be a nonnegative real. Utility streams are supposed to take value in the space
∞ allows for infinite and unbounded utility streams but it requires bounded growth-rates of utility. This condition is justifie ds i n c ei ti ss t a n d a r dt oc o nsider on the one hand that the set of feasible consumption growth-rates is up-bounded, on the other hand that utility is a concave function of consumption.
Equipped with the norm:
∞ is a Banach vector space.
Theorem 2 have recourse to the extension form of the Hahn-Banach theorem asserting the existence of a continuous and linear extension to the whole space, for any continuous linear functional defined on a subspace of a Banach space. I refer to Luenberger (1968) for an expose of the extension form (page 111) and the geometric form (page 133) of the Hahn-Banach theorem. The geometric form asserts the existence of a continuous linear functional supporting a convex subset of a Banach space. It is invoked to prove theorem 5.
The validity of the Hahn-Banach theorem in non separable Banach spaces relies on the axiom of choice (Luenberger 1968 , page 111). Since l r ∞ is not separable, theorem 3 and theorem 5 both rely on the axiom of choice. This could raise objections because of the nonconstructiveness of the mathematical objects which existence is proved in theorem 3 and theorem 5. However, it is that complete constructiveness is not needed to draw some interesting and exploitable conclusions. ∞ and x ∈ l r ∞ ,t h ei m a g eo fx by y is denoted y (x).I ti sk n o w nt h a t the dual of a Banach space is a Banach space, equipped with the norm
Spaces corresponding to r =0are denoted respectively l ∞ , l * ∞ , l 1 , c, and c 0 .
Decomposition of l r * ∞
The Yosida-Hewitt theorem (Lauwers 1998 
where y 1 verifies: 
∞ according to the formula kxk =sup i∈N * |x i | e −i.r and kxk is evaluated in l ∞ according to the formula kxk =sup i∈N * |x i |.A sar e s u l t ,I r is isometric.
We al s o have
We can associate to each y in l r * ∞ , a functional I * r (y) as follows for all x in l ∞ ,I * r (y)(x)=y(I r (x)) 3 I owe to an anonymous referee the idea to use an isometric isomorphism in the proofs of theorem 3 and theorem 5. In this manner, these proofs are simpler than they were in the first version of paper.
It is easily checked that I * r (y) is linear. I r being isometric, the continuity of I * r (y) results from the continuity of y.T h u s ,I * r (y) is in l * ∞ . In addition, it is easily checked that the mapping I * r is linear and bijective from l 
Sensitivity to long-term interest
Moreover, let r n (h) be the sequence of c r obtained by setting to 0 the n first terms of h,t h e n ∂f ∂∞
The same formula holds with lim inf .
Proof. Existence of ∂f ∂∞ (x 0 ) results from theorem 3. Let h ∈ c r .S i n c ef is a function from l r ∞ to R ,F r e c h e t -d i fferentiable at x 0 ∈ l r ∞ ,f o ra l lε>0 there is α>0 such that:
It is a positive and decreasing sequence converging to |δ r ∞ (h)|.W eha v ealso
T h es a m ep r oo fa p p l i e sf o rlim inf . 
Generalization of the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem
The proof of the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem is based on the geometric version of Hahn-Banach theorem. As said in section 3, the Hahn-Banach theorem holds in l r ∞ . This allows to generalize theorem 1. This generalization is theorem 5. By clarifying the structure of l r * ∞ , theorem 3 will then make it possible to exploit theorem 5, as in corollary 6 and corollary 7.
In this section and the next one, the axioms weak Pareto, weak inv(a i + x i ) and minimal individual symmetry are the same than the correspondent axioms in the finite case, except that the space of alternatives is l r ∞ instead of R n . The axiom anonymity has several versions in the infinite case. Each version corresponds to a requirement of invariance of the ranking with respect to a given set of permutations. The bigger the set of permutation, the higher the l e v e lo fa n o n y m i t y .F o re x a m p l e :
finite anonymity corresponds to invariance with respect to finite permutations.
fix e ds t e pa n o n y m i t ycorresponds to invariance with respect to fixed step permutations. A permutation σ on the set of positive integers N * is said to be fixed step iff there exists a partition of N * : N 1 ,N 2 ...such that ∀i, j, |N i | = |N j | and σ canbew rittenasthecom positionofperm utationsσ 1 • σ 2 • ...where for all i and j such that j 6 = i, σ i leaves invariant all the elements of N j .
Since finite permutations constitute a subset of the set of fixed step permutations, fixed step anonymity is stronger than finite anonymity.Ir e f e rt o Proof. With the help of some adaptations, the proof is the same one as that of theorem 1. This proof is exposed in detail in d'Aspremont-Gevers (2002, page 57). I repeat the stages where adaptations are necessary, in particular when it is referred to l r ∞ or to the interior of its positive cone, or to properties related to its norm. It is known that the interiors of each of the sets l ∞++ and l ∞+ in l ∞ are the same set {x ∈ l ∞ / inf x i > 0}.A sar e s u l t ,l ∞++ and l ∞+ have also the same interior in l r ∞ : the set {x ∈ l r ∞ / inf x i e −i.r > 0}.T h u s
In comparison with the proof of d'Aspremont-Gevers (2002), it is necessary to replace the positive cone of R n , P = {p ∈ R n /p i > 0 for all i} by Let ϕ = ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 be the decomposition of ϕ given by theorem 3. In the context of intergenerational choice (or intertemporal choice with infinite horizon), the component ϕ 1 corresponds to discounted utilitarianism. According to the definition of l r 1 ,t h ec o e fficients of ϕ 1 ,d e n o t e dϕ 1n , tend exponentially towards 0 at infinity. Consequently, ϕ 1 is only sensitive to short-term interest. Concerning the component ϕ 2 , for all x in l r ∞ , ϕ 2 (x) depends only on limits of sequences obtained from subsequences of x. Consequently, ϕ 2 is only sensitive to long-term interest (the coefficient ∂ϕ ∂∞ ,measuring the sensitivity of ϕ to changes in long-term well-being, depends only on ϕ 2 ). We may say that ϕ 1 is the short-term component and ϕ 2 the long-term component of the order. As ϕ 2 is linear, I suggest to name functionals like ϕ 2 (i.e. which restriction to c r is proportional to δ r ∞ ) "linear limits". Lauwers (1998) gives examples of linear limits on l ∞ : medial limits and integrals against measures based on free ultrafilters. If the conditions were added that ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are both non-null, the form ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 corresponds to what Chilchinisky (1996) called sustainable preference. This form respects at the same time short-term and long-term interests. Chilchinisky (1996) axiomatized that by introducing two axioms: non dictatorship of the present and non dictatorship of the future. If the condition of stationarity is imposed, Lauwers ( 1 9 9 8 )s h o w e d( l e m m a2 )t h a to n eo ft h et w oc o m p o n e n t sϕ 1 or ϕ 2 must be null. For the definitions of non dictatorship of the future, non dictatorship of the present and stationarity, I refer respectively to Chilchinisky (1996) and Lauwers (1998) . Moreover, Lauwers (1998) showed that ϕ 2 may guarantee a level of anonymity higher than finite anonymity. Fleurbaey-Michel (2003) noticed that this level of anonymity, which may be referred to as Lauwers anonymity, is higher than fixed step anonymity. But the incompatibility of Lauwers anonymity with weak Pareto m a k e st h a tt h e yr e g a r di ta st o oh i g h , opinion which seems to be followed in the literature. Likewise, most authors reject linear limits as social welfare functions because they fail to check weak Pareto which is seen as a minimal sensitivity axiom. To clarify more the boundary of the clash between anonymity and the Pareto axioms, Mitra-Basu (2007) characterize the class of permutations for which utility streams can be pronounced to be indifferent without conflicting with the strong Pareto axiom. The set of fixed-step permutations is included in that class.
5A p p l i c a t i o n
Equitable utilitarianism
Axiom weak Pareto obviously entails super weak Pareto. As axioms weak Pareto and weak inv(a i + x i ) are often used, theorem 5 should be useful in fields such as the study of links between axioms, or the axiomatization of social welfare relations for infinite and unbounded utility streams. For example, the following corollary shows that, to some extent, linear limits must nevertheless be satisfied in a certain way if one wishes to satisfy super weak Pareto, weak inv(a i + x i ) and finite anonymity. These three axioms may be considered as minimal axioms for equitable intergenerational utilitarianism. Linear limits are an example of orders satisfying super weak Pareto, weak inv(a i + x i ) and finite anonymity.
In growth theory, models generally suppose a positive growth rate, i.e. r>0. But in the literature dealing with the evaluation of infinite utility streams, the case r =0is more usual. In the present section, I set r =0 . The following analysis can be easily extended to the case r>0.
Corollary 6 Let R be an order on l ∞ satisfying super weak Pareto, weak inv(a i + x i ) and minimal individual symmetry (resp. finite anonymity). Let ϕ be the linear functional given by theorem 5 and ϕ = ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 the decomposition of ϕ given by theorem 3. We must either have every component of ϕ 1 positive or ϕ 1 =0(resp. ϕ 1 =0).
Proof. From minimal individual symmetry, it is clear that if a component of ϕ 1 is positive, every other component of ϕ 1 must also be positive. Suppose now that R satisfies finite anonymity.L e te n be the sequence of l ∞ such that e ni =0if i 6 = n and e nn =1 .W eh a v eϕ 2 (e n )=0 .T h u s ,ϕ (e n )= ϕ 1 (e n )=ϕ 1n . Suppose there is n, m such that ϕ 1n >ϕ 1m .T h e nw ew o u l d have ϕ (e n ) >ϕ(e m ), what would imply e n Â e m . This contradicts that R is finite anonymous since e m can be obtained from e n by a finite permutation.
As a result, we have ϕ 1n = ϕ 1m for all n, m ≥ 1.N o wm ak em tend to infinity. Then ϕ 1m tends to 0 because the sum A consequence of corollary 6 is that every maximal point in a subset s of l ∞ with respect to an order R on l ∞ satisfying super weak Pareto, weak inv(a i +x i ) and finite anonymity, is also a maximal point in s with respect to some positive linear limit (the positivity of ϕ 2 results from the positivity of ϕ). It is in that sense that I said that linear limits must nevertheless be satisfied, despite their insensivity. Since in the context of intergenerational choice ϕ 2 determines the optimal long-term behavior, we can express this by saying that R must comply entirely with long-term optimality.
The intransigence of the future
Consider now an order R on l ∞ satisfying super weak Pareto and weak inv(a i + x i ). Let ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 be the decomposition of R given by theorem 3 and theorem 5. I show that if R only checks the weaker assumption ϕ 2 6 =0instead of finite anonymity, the consequence of corollary 6, pointed out above, nevertheless holds.
Let s be the set (included in l ∞ ) of feasible utility streams starting from some initial conditions. It is not unrealistic to suppose that s satisfies the two conditions:
Condition A: For any x, y in s and any date n,there is an integer m ≥ n +1 and a vector (z n+1,..., z m ) such that the stream
is in s.
Condition B: For any x in s, if y in l ∞ is such that x i ≥ y i for all i in N * ,th en y is in s.
Condition A says that it is always possible to jump from any stream x to any stream y, if necessary with the help of some transitional period of sacrifice: z n+1,..., z m .
Condition B says that it is always feasible to throw away utility. Proof. Suppose that x in s is a maximal point for R. Suppose there exists y in s such that ϕ 2 (x) <ϕ 2 (y)
Let n be a positive integer and (z n+1,..., z m ) the sequence given by condition A. Denote x n y the following stream: (x n y) i = x i for i in {1, ..., n} (x n y) i =inf(x i ,z i ) for i in {n +1, ..., m} (x n y) i = y i for i ≥ m +1
where (x n y) i is the i th component of x n y.
Condition B imply (x n y) ∈ s .M o r e o v e r ,kx n yk ≤ sup (kxk , kyk) for all n. Denote ϕ 1i the i th component of ϕ 1 .W eh a v e |ϕ 1 (x n y) − ϕ 1 (x)| =¯¯¯¯∞ For all n in N * , ϕ 2 (x n y)=ϕ 2 (y) and (ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 )(x n y)=ϕ 1 (x n y)+ϕ 2 (y). We t hen have lim n→∞ (ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 )(x n y)=ϕ 1 (x)+ϕ 2 (y) > (ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 )(x) . Thus, there would exist N in N * such that for all n ≥ N, (ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 )(x n y) > (ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 )(x). Therefore, x would not be maximal in s for ϕ 1 +ϕ 2 ,whatimplies that x would not be maximal in s for R. A contradiction.
Corollary 7 shows that, under super weak Pareto and weak inv(a i + x i ), as soon as ϕ 2 is non null, it "imposes its views" in the sense that optimality according to R entails optimality according to ϕ 2 .I ti sr e m a r k a b l et h a tR need not be equitable to be "under the orders" of ϕ 2 .
In the context of intergenerational choice, if ϕ 2 =0and ϕ 1 6 =0, R is presentoriented and if ϕ 1 =0and ϕ 2 6 =0, R is future-oriented. If ϕ 1 6 =0and ϕ 2 6 =0, we may say that we grant to the present and the future comparable considerations. Hence, it is possible to restate corollary 7 as follows: under super weak Pareto and weak inv(a i + x i ), if an intergenerational order R grants to the present and the future comparable considerations, it must comply entirely with long-term optimality. In other words, showing some fairness between the present and the future results in satisfying the future fully. One could call this property: the intransigence of the future.
Notice that the assumption ϕ 2 6 =0is not formally needed in the proof of corollary 7. However, if ϕ 2 were null, long-term optimality would not correspond to optimality according to ϕ 2 .
This consequence of corollary 7 might suggest that the future has too much power. But on the other hand future is majority and giving power to majority is generally seen as desirable. Moreover, complying with long-term optimality is compatible with Chichilnisky axiom non dictatorship of the future. It does not entail insensivity toward the present.
